Revilla Law Firm, P.A.
The
Deportation Defense Firm
2250 S.W. 3rd Avenue
Miami,
Florida 33129
Phone (305) 858-2323
Toll-Free (877) 854-2323
Fax
(305) 858-2321
CERTAIN WAIVERS FOR CRIMINAL AND
NON-CRIMINAL GROUNDS OF REMOVAL
212(c)
A waiver under former section
212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is available to those lawful
permanent residents with aggravated felony convictions who pled guilty/nolo
contendere or who were convicted after trial prior to April 24, 1996.
INS v. St. Cry, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). Whether a waiver is available
to an individual availed himself of the right to trial depends on the federal
circuit court of appeal with jurisdiction over the court. A waiver under 212(c)
is available to lawful permanent residents with convictions for crimes
involving moral turpitude who pled or went to trial (depending on the circuit
court) prior to April 1, 1997.
In jurisdictions where section
212(c) is only available to those individuals who pled to their convictions the
argument should still be made that the rationale of reliance on the
availability of 212(c) relief should also apply to those who availed themselves
of the right to trial. This is a developing area of law and the arguments
should be made before the immigration court to preserve the arguments for
appeal.
When determining
eligibility for section 212(c) relief based on a plea the starting point for
the analysis is the date that the plea was agreed to by the individual.
In many criminal jurisdictions the plea is agreed to before sentencing.
Sometimes the plea is orally agreed to by the defense and the prosecution prior
to going to court and putting the agreement on the record. The key date
is the date that the plea was agreed to by the parties, not necessarily when
the criminal judge accepted the plea.
Additionally, to be eligible for
212(c) relief the individual must not have been convicted and served more than
five years in prison after November 29, 1990. If the individual was
convicted before November 29, 1990, and served more than five years after this
date he or she is still eligible for 212(c) relief.2 An individual who
was convicted after November 29, 1990, is ineligible for 212(c) relief if he
has served more than 5 years in prison.
212(d)(3)
A 212 (d)(3) waiver is available to a non-immigrant visa holder
seeking admission to the United States. It is not available to someone
who has engaged in genocide, espionage, sabotage, has sought to overthrow the
government by force, or any unlawful activity.
As the BIA decided in
Matter of Hranka, 16 I & N Dec. 491, Int. Dec. 2644 (BIA 1978), the factors
looked at to determine a 212(d)(3) waiver include the reasons for the
applicant's seeking entry into the U.S., the seriousness of the applicant's
criminal background or violation of immigration law, and the risk of harm to
society if the applicant is admitted. The Board held that the factors
addressed above need not be “compelling”, as there exists no
statutory requirement for someone to present compelling reasons in order for
them to enter the United States. As such, a balancing of the equities
should be employed in assessing the likelihood of success for a 212(d)(3)
waiver.
212(h)
A non-lawful permanent resident may
seek waivers under section 212(h) for the following:
- prostitution;
- commission of more than one
crime;
- crimes where immunity was
asserted and;
- single offense of simple
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana;
- crimes involving moral
turpitude.
It is unavailable for controlled
substance and trafficking offenses. Nor is it available for individuals
convicted of or who have attempted having admitted to murder or acts involving
torture.
If the activity for
which the individual is inadmissible is related to prostitution or occurred
more than 15 years before the date of application for adjustment, the
individual only has to establish rehabilitation and that his admission would
not be contrary to national welfare, safety, or security of the United
States.5 This is a much easier burden of proof than establishing a waiver
for criminal activities that occurred within 15 years of application for
adjustment. This particular waiver for criminal activities beyond 15
years is easily overlooked. This is why it is particularly important to
carefully analyze the record of conviction to ascertain the exact date of
criminal activity.
A non-lawful permanent resident
whose criminal activities, except prostitution, causing inadmissibility which
occurred within 15 years of the application for adjustment may be eligible for
a waiver under 212(h)(1)(B) if it is established that the individual's removal
will result in extreme hardship to a spouse, parent, son, or daughter who is a
lawful permanent resident or United States citizen.
The regulation found at 8 C.F.R.
section 1212.7(c)(9)(d) severely limits the standard of proof for individuals
attempting to apply for a 212(h) waiver whose crimes are considered violent or
dangerous. If the criminal activity involves violent or dangerous crimes
the immigration court will generally not favorably exercise discretion in
granting a waiver under 212(h)(2) except in extraordinary circumstances.
The extraordinary circumstances are national security or foreign policy
considerations or where exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is clearly
demonstrated. Even if extraordinary circumstances are shown, the
Immigration Court, depending on the gravity of the offense, may not favorably
exercise discretion. The result is that individuals must establish that
their qualifying relatives would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship instead of just extreme hardship.
This regulation can be
subject to challenge in Immigration Court. The starting point for a
challenge to this regulation is that there is no statutory or regulatory
definition for a violent or dangerous crime. Former Attorney General John
Ashcroft promulgated the regulation based on a case where he reversed the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec.
373 (AG 2002). It was the judgment of the Attorney General in
Matter of Jean that where the criminal conduct is as serious as that of the
Respondent, where she beat and shook a child to death, the balance of
equities will nearly always require a denial of discretionary relief.
Matter of Jean at 383. The Attorney General went on to decide that, "It
would not be a prudent exercise of the discretion afforded to me by this
provision to grant favorable adjustments of status to violent or dangerous
individuals except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving
national or foreign police considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly
demonstrates that the denial of status adjustment would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship. Moreover, depending on the gravity of the
alien's underlying criminal offense, such a showing might still be
insufficient."
The Attorney General did not
provide a definition for a violent or dangerous crime or what constitutes such
a crime. The closest he came to a definition is the example of the crime
in Matter of Jean as a violent or dangerous crime. Therefore, the crime
at issue in a section 212(h) case may be subject to divergent interpretations
as to whether it is violent or dangerous, especially when compared to the crime
in Matter of Jean. A careful analysis of the underlying facts of the
crime may be very helpful in arguing that the crime is not violent or
dangerous.
Section 212(h) of the
Act clearly sets forth limitations or restrictions as to the eligibility of
lawful permanent residents for a waiver under this section. The limiting
provision at issue provides as follows:
No waiver shall be provided under
this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the
United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either
since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated
felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States
for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of
initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States.
212(i)
A fraud waiver under 212(i)
for violation of fraudulent or material misrepresentation is available if the
person is the spouse, son or daughter of a USC or LPR. The person
must demonstrate extreme hardship to the USC or LPR spouse or
parent. The factors considered in determining extreme hardship to the
qualifying relative include the USC or LPR=s ties to the country of removal and
the U.S., the conditions of the country of removal and significant health
conditions of the USC or LPR, employability in the country of removal and the
financial, emotional, cultural conditions of the country of
removal.
The waiver is also available to a
self petitioned battered spouse who can also demonstrate extreme hardship to
him/herself or her USC or LPR parent or child. The 212(i) waiver is unavailable
to waive 212(a)(6)(F) arising from a final order under
INA 274C.
CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL FOR CERTAIN
PERMANENT RESIDENTS
The BIA, in Matter
of Yanez-Garcia, 23 I & N Dec. 390, Int. Dec. 3473 (BIA 2002), held that
the determination of whether a state drug offense constitutes a "drug
trafficking crime@ under 18 U.S.C. '924(c)(2), such that it may be considered
an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. '1101(a)(43)(B) (2000), shall be made by reference to
decisional authority from the federal circuit courts of appeals, and not by
reference to any separate legal standard adopted by the BIA. This created
a conflict among the circuits as to simple possession drug crimes being
considered aggravated felonies. For example, an individual in the Ninth
Circuit convicted of cocaine possession would not be considered an aggravated
felon while the same individual in the Eleventh Circuit would be considered an
aggravated felon. The result is that in one jurisdiction an individual is
eligible for cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents while in
another jurisdiction the same individual would be precluded from applying for
cancellation of removal as an aggravated felon.
The Supreme Court of the United
States recently resolved this conflict in Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. 625
(2006). The Court found that a felony drug crime under state law but a
misdemeanor under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) is not a
felony punishable under the CSA. The Court reasoned that the only
aggravated felony in the INA related to drugs is "illicit trafficking in a
controlled substance" including a “drug trafficking crime” under
101(a)(43)(B). The Court noted that illicit trafficking is not defined by
the Act. Title 18 USC section 924(c)(2) defines "drug trafficking crime"
to include "any felony punishable under the CSA.” As a result, the
Court looked to the common sense meaning of illicit trafficking and found that
simple possession of a controlled substance cannot in any way be considered
“illicit trafficking” or a “drug trafficking crime” as
a felony punishable under the CSA.
The consequence of
this decision is paramount. Now those individuals convicted of simple
possession of a controlled substance, such as cocaine, who otherwise meet the
eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal for certain permanent
residents can now apply for this form of relief because such a crime is no
longer an aggravated felony.
CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL FOR CERTAIN
NON-PERMANENT RESIDENTS UNDER SECTION 240A(b)(1) OF THE ACT
A person qualifies for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) if she is in removal proceedings
because she is inadmissible or deportable and (1) has been physically present
in the U.S. continuously for ten years; (2) has had good moral character for
that time; (3) has not been convicted of certain offenses listed in sections
212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(3) and (4) to deport her would cause
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her lawful permanent resident or
U.S. citizen spouse, parent or child.
10 YEARS OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN
THE US
The applicant must have 10 years of
continuous physical presence before the Notice to Appear is served to the
applicant. Section 240A(d)(1). The ten year clock also stops when
the person commits certain enumerated crimes under sections 212(a)(2),
237(a)(2), or 237(a)(3).
Consider whether the individual
comes within the criminal bars listed above. If so, consider whether the
person can establish good moral character. If the person can pass both
tests, then you need to consider the clock stopping rule.
Further, the applicant need not
show that she never left the U.S. for purposes of establishing continuous
physical presence, so long as the absence from the U.S. during the ten year
period was less than ninety days or the total time outside the U.S. was less
than 180 days. Section 240A(d)(2).
CRIMINAL BARS
Under section 240A(b)(1), a person
is barred from applying for cancellation if they have been convicted of an
offense under '' 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(3)". The crimes include
a crime involving moral turpitude, a controlled substance offense, an
aggravated felony, high speed flight from immigration checkpoint, firearms
offenses, domestic violence related offenses, to name just a few.
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
Under 101(f), a person
is automatically prevented from establishing Good Moral Character ("GMC"),
including conviction or admission of a drug offense, except a single conviction
of less than 30 grams of marijuana, reason to believe the person is a drug
trafficker, conviction or admission of a crime involving moral turpitude, alien
smuggling, engaging in prostitution, habitual drunkard, providing false
testimony in order to acquire an immigration benefit, murder, conviction
of an aggravated felony after November 29, 1990, etc. Letters from
co-workers, supervisors, school personnel, religious personnel, and others that
have been enriched by the applicant's activities should be gathered and
submitted to the Immigration Judge.
EXCEPTIONAL AND
EXTREMELY UNUSUAL HARDSHIP
Assuming all other elements have
been satisfied, and assuming a "qualifying relative" exists, demonstrating
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the applicant's lawful permanent
resident or U.S. citizen spouse, parent or child will in most cases be the
largest hurdle.
The concept "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" continues to evolve. In one of it's early
cases, the BIA, in denying cancellation of removal to the applicant in In Re
Francisco Javier Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I & N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001), looked at
factors such as the applicant having elderly parents whose support is solely
provided by the applicant, compelling health or special needs of the qualifying
child, and the effects that relocation to a country with a lower standard of
living or civil strife has on a USC or LPR family member.
Later, in In Re Martha Andazola-Rivas, 23 I & N Dec. 319 (BIA
2002), the BIA expanded it=s definition of hardship. It held that the
hardship to the qualifying relative must be "substantially different@ that
would otherwise be expected as a result of being deported to a lesser developed
country. In the same year, the BIA, in Matter of Recinas, 23 I & N
Dec. 467 (BIA 2002), granted cancellation of removal to Ms. Recinas, a single
mother of 4 US citizen children. They found that the children would
suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if she was returned to
Mexico, since they knew of no other way of life outside of the U.S., they did
not speak, read or write Spanish at all, were financially, emotionally and
otherwise totally dependent on their mother, the mother did not have any family
members in Mexico to care for the children, the increased level of difficulty
for a single woman in Mexico to find work and a home that would allow her to
provide a supportive home, the strong family support and the ties with the
children and their grandparents (who lawfully reside in the U.S.) and the
unlikely scenario that any other family members would return to Mexico with Ms.
Recinas, and the fact that, despite having USC siblings and LPR parents, the
mother has no other realistic way of immigrating to the U.S., since the waiting
lists are long.
There is no one factor that is more
compelling than the other. However, the BIA has taken a “totality
of the circumstances” approach in assessing what is exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship. Taking a creative stance on the type and
degree of hardship can only serve to push the envelope in trying a successful
case for cancellation of removal.